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Rewriting history: the information age and the knowable past 
 
 
Does history any longer have meaning in the information age? Baudrillard has described 
history as ‘our lost referential, that is to say our myth’
1
. History seems to slip away in the 
precession of simulacra accompanying mass media and digital computing: ever-present if 
inauthentic versions of the past overwhelm any sense of historical continuity. Arguably we live 
in an era of timeless time, or time without chronology in which the very patterns of our daily 
lives are disrupted
2
. Some theorists suggest we have reached the end of history
3
; others that 
real historical research is no longer either possible or desirable
4
. In the ephemeral spaces of 
the information society history apparently lacks purchase. As an emerging discipline, 
information history must take seriously the proposition that information itself possesses 
historical agency. It must develop ways of understanding the past that address both 
‘information as a central theme’ and its ‘impact upon existing historical theses’
5
. This chapter 
argues that structural transformations in the production and consumption of information 
accompanying the transition to the information society require us to rethink both the nature of 
history and our relationship with the past. They do so because of the tendency of mass media 
and digital computing to undermine the ontological stability that writing was assumed to 
possess in the modern age. A subtle complicity exists between writing and history. In 
unpicking that complicity we might uncover new kinds of previously marginalized historicity.   
 
 
Over the past twenty years a lingering crisis has slowly played itself out in the discourse of 
scholarly history. Driven by epistemological scepticism
6
, postmodernist historiography has 
emerged to challenge many of the received assumption of historical research, drawing 
attention to history’s highly literary nature. In many ways history can be situated as a 
predominantly literary activity: a process of rewriting the written records of the past. Hayden 
White for example described history as ‘a verbal structure in the form of a narrative prose 
discourse’
7
  with an ‘ineluctably poetic nature’
8
. Ankersmit suggests ‘that historical knowledge 
is as much “made” (by the historian’s language) as it is “found” (in the archives)’
9
. Munslow 
that ‘history is best understood as what it plainly is – a narrative about the past’
10
. But while 
this literary nature of historical research is widely acknowledged
11
, postmodernist scepticism 
goes further, questioning whether history can ever transcend its status as a literary activity to 
reveal the truths of past experience. It should already be clear that I have some sympathy 
with these perspectives. However, I do not find them adequate. The problem of history in the 
information age is not predominantly epistemological; it is also ontological. It concerns not 
only the literary nature of historical accounts, but also the ontological stability of the historical 
trace itself, which shares with those accounts a dependency on the medium of writing. 
Structural changes to the production and consumption of information have destabilised the 
historical trace, undermining a key tenet of scholarly history: the idea of a knowable past. 
 The postmodernist history theorist Keith Jenkins has noted that the past and history 
are different things adding that they ‘float free of each other; they are ages and miles apart’
12
. 
The phenomenal reality of past experiences is only rarely seriously doubted
13
, but the 
possibility of adequately re-presenting those experiences in historical works remains more 
problematic. Jenkins highlights the gulf between the truths of history and the truths of the 
past, questioning whether they are ever really commensurable. Most historians believe they 
are. Fulbrook notes that ‘most historians make at least an implicit claim for some degree of 
truth value for what they are saying’
14
. The incomplete nature of the surviving record, the 
further filtering, selection and arrangement that is subsequently made, and the re-
presentation of those traces in predominantly narrative forms mean that historical 
interpretations always retain a degree of contingency. The truths of the past belong to the 
past. Nevertheless through disinterested critical distance historical accounts can approach 
objectivity, validating their claims against the events and experiences they seek to both 
contain and understand. The historian aspires to understand the past in Ranke’s terms ‘as it 
really was’ whilst acknowledging the ultimate impossibility of that aspiration. In this way 
history can become more than a purely literary or fictive activity. Alun Munslow explains:    
 
Modernist or ‘proper’ history bases its claims to legitimacy as a discipline by 
discovering the meaning of a past reality: a meaning that is enduring and can be 
described or represented faithfully by the suitably distanced historian.
15
 
 
History is therefore generally situated as a broadly empirical pursuit grounded in the surviving 
traces of the past by which the past is rendered knowable. Fulbrook notes ‘there is 
extraordinarily widespread agreement that sources are the bedrock of historical research’
16
; 
Eaglestone argues this ‘is perhaps the central convention of the genre of history, and 
differentiates it most clearly from fiction’
17
. The surviving traces legitimize scholarly history, 
both testifying to past experience and validating particular historical interpretations.  
It is in this assumption that the truths of past experience are revealed by the surviving 
record, not merely in the in the process of transforming those records into historical 
narratives, that the challenge to history in the information age is located. I want to frame that 
idea by another passing comment by Keith Jenkins, who draws here on the cultural critic and 
theorist Tony Bennett. This is therefore an uncompromisingly unconventional view of the 
historical process, and that it precisely its value: 
 
What is at issue in historiography – and indeed what can only ever be at issue – is 
what can be derived and constructed from the historicised record or archive. It is the 
‘historicised’ nature of the records/archives that historians access that must be 
stressed here. For such records and archives are, as Bennett explains, only too 
clearly highly volatile and mutable products of complex historical processes in that, 
apart from the considerable amount of organised labour (librarians, archivists, 
archaeologists, curators) which goes into their production (preservation, cataloguing, 
indexing, ‘weeding out’), the composition and potential of such traces/records vary 
considerably in terms of their potential use over time
18
. 
 
Jenkins does not explore the consequences of this further, but from arguments presented 
elsewhere, it is reasonable to assume he might understand the historicized record to function 
primarily in ideological terms, valorising certain perspectives and marginalising others
19
. 
There can be no doubt that what comes to be constituted in the historical record significantly 
influences the kinds of histories that can be made. Furthermore information professionals in 
their various guises contribute to this process as Jenkins implies. Elsewhere I have noted that 
decisions made in collection management are explicitly ideologically situated, even though 
the information professions tend not to frame their work in ideological terms
20
. Changes to 
what come to be constituted as the record in the library and archive also change the kinds of 
histories that can be written. This already historicised nature of the trace problemetises 
scholarly history’s assumption that the past is rendered knowable by what is revealed in the 
historical record. It implies that historical narratives are already written into the record by 
those very historical processes to which it also testifies. Information history perhaps has an 
important role to play in critiquing how information as a product of particular social and 
cultural contexts, mediated by particular institutions such as the archive or library, and 
embedded within particular historically situated social processes comes to influence the ways 
in which we frame our understanding of the past. By telling the story of the record, its 
production, consumption and retention, it might uncover new kinds of historical experience.  
 This idea becomes critical to the problem of history in the information age because of 
explicit changes to the nature and status of record-making; it is the inadequacy of the digital 
record that causes history to lose its purchase. Throughout the period of high modernity the 
making of records was generally driven by what Weber described as administrative rationality, 
implying deliberate and purposeful actions
21
. In information rich societies by contrast records 
are often produced as a by-produce of our use of digital technologies. Almost everything we 
do leaves a trace inscribed in the digital sphere. But although information is proliferating 
exponentially
22
, and in the process both inscribing a more complete picture of our lives than 
ever before and making possible new kinds of historical research
23
, much of it remains highly 
ephemeral. The average lifespan of a website for example is less than seventy-five days
24
. 
This intrinsic ephemerality is exacerbated by the volatile nature of digital media; Conway has 
noted that ‘our capacity to record information has increased exponentially over time while the 
longevity of the media used to store the information has reduced equivalently’
25
. Digital 
content lacks persistence; the material record often survives unless it is deliberately 
destroyed; the digital record is usually lost unless it is deliberately preserved. Consequently, 
while the information age ‘will undoubtedly have recorded more data than any other period in 
history, it will also almost certainly have lost more information”
26
. 
The volatile nature of the digital record has led to ongoing concerns about the 
preservation of digital culture. Some theorists fear the emergence of a new dark age, in which 
not records survive to testify to present experience
27
. Others fear digital technologies make 
history itself impossible, rendering the pasts of the future unknowable. Vincent suggests that 
‘a study based on the written word cannot survive the marginalization of paper’
28
. He argues 
that that ‘we may be on the verge of a new prehistory’ adding that: 
 
Electronic communication means no history. The fashion for open access means no 
history. The mass production of evidence, and its mass destruction on an industrial 
scale, means no history
29
. 
 
Historical scholarship is faced with a looming crisis of relevancy and legitimacy, driven in part 
by the changing status of the record within the situated habits and traditions of the information 
age. But if the volatile nature of the digital record suggests from one perspective the 
emergence of a new dark age or the end of history, from another it suggests only that there is 
something wrong with way in which scholarly history has embedded the idea of a knowable 
past in its persistent written traces. If we want to maintain that history still has meaning, we 
therefore need to explore what that meaning can be in an age when the historical trace is 
itself subject to such comprehensive destabilisation. Information history must address not only 
the story of the record, but also how that story might transform what history can mean in the 
information age.  
 In part this must entail a re-examination of the influence of historically situated modes 
of communication on the ways in which we interpret the traces of the past. Because the idea 
of the already historicised record presents a more challenging set of problems than those 
Jenkins suggests. While on the one hand the written record is always already worked-over in 
the ways he describes, on the other writing itself also involves historically situated traditions, 
values and beliefs. Mayhew has noted of the record that ‘both the message it embodies and 
the medium through which that embodiment occurs are themselves historically contingent’
30
. 
And following McLuhan we now know well enough that both medium and message must 
make a contribution to the agency writing may have
31
. But the idea of medium should not be 
reduced to the mere carriers that McLuhan implied; it is the entire set of social practices and 
values that accompany the uses of writing, perhaps what Williams nebulously termed 
‘structures of feeling’
32
. It follows that as uses of writing change, from for example analogue to 
digital, or manuscript to print, the ways in which we understand the experiences it inscribes 
may also change. Printing helped underpin Enlightenment rationalism and the idea of a 
knowable past by stabilising writing in the printed text. Digital technologies are progressively 
undermining those ideas by destabilising writing once again. To understand the challenges to 
historical scholarship posed by the information age we therefore need to explore how the 
notion of a knowable past emerged under particular technological conditions in the production 
and reproduction of writing; we need to see ways of historicising the past as themselves 
products of particular historically situated traditions, values and beliefs. 
 
 
 
The pursuit of a knowable past made accessible through interrogation of the meanings 
inscribed in the surviving historical traces reflects a dominant mode in current historical 
research, but it is not the only possible way of historicising the past. One of the earliest 
English uses of the word history with something like its modern connotations occurs in 
Gower’s Confessio Amantis, written in an age on the very cusp of print. Gower’s idea of 
histoire neither implied historical veracity nor any attempt to objectively document past 
experiences. History was a framework for hanging moral truths ‘essampled of these olde 
wyse’ for the benefit of ‘oure tyme among ous hiere’
33
. It was intrinsically present-centred. 
Within a century Caxton used history to suggest the continuous methodical record of events 
and circumstances
34
.  What Tosh terms historical consciousness
35
 arguably germinated in 
late manuscript culture and began to take root in the transition to print. We might therefore 
imagine from what has been suggested above that print reproduction rapidly changed the 
ways in which we relate to the past. But the histories written in the subsequent centuries were 
not empirical accounts; historical works continued to be ecumenical about evidence, lacking 
later scholarship’s rigorous classification of source materials
36
, and frequently placing 
scripture, literature, myth and tradition on an equal footing in ways that reflected ‘the 
Enlightenment’s pre-historical notion of historical change’
37
. Marwick has suggested that even 
by the Eighteenth century, ‘in their contempt for basic scholarship and research […] historians 
showed an unjustifiable carelessness’
38
. History ‘continued to be marked by a combination of 
moral engagement and literary endeavour’
39
 that exposed its characteristic present-
centeredness.  
 It took a more radical break to separate historical writing from the highly literary 
contexts in which it was traditionally embedded.  Between Caxton and Collingwood mass 
publishing emerged to unsettle the cosy hegemony of literary culture. This reflected changing 
socio-cultural contexts following in the wake of the industrial revolution rather than any 
significant shift in the technology of the press. The 1709 Statute of Anne and 1886 Berne 
Convention enabled the more effective economic exploitation of written works. Abolition of the 
‘taxes on knowledge’ between 1853 and 1861, including advertisement duty, stamp duty on 
newspaper, and paper duty, further helped emancipate the printed word
40
. Educational 
reforms throughout the nineteenth century greatly increased literacy and created a new 
reading public
41
. The Improving transport infrastructure facilitated the distribution of books and 
journals. Contemporary commentators noted the change to reading habits throughout this 
period, one observing that ‘people are used to reading nowadays in places where twenty 
years since a book was hardly available’ and another that ‘a passion for reading becomes 
commoner from day to day and spreads among all classes’
42
. The emergence of mass 
publishing was widely regarded with mistrust; many feared it would drown literary culture 
under the ‘smother of new books’
43
. The inevitable tension erupted in a sustained 
epistemological crisis of sometimes veiled and sometimes vitriolic antagonism, epitomized for 
example by Arnold, Leavis and Eliot
44
.  
It was amid these wider social changes during the nineteenth century that history 
became uniquely associated with the idea of an empirically knowable past
45
. This transition 
reflected not merely an increased sophistication in historical methods borrowed in part from 
philology and the emerging social sciences
46
, but also a conscious effort to break with the 
long tradition of broadly historical writing. The first act of scholarly history was to differentiate 
the new empirically grounded pursuit of an objective past from the literary histories that came 
before; history was established as a discipline ‘independent from philosophy or literature’
47
. It 
explicitly proclaimed itself a science; ‘professional’ history replaced ‘amateur’ history as the 
foundation of our relationship with the past
48
. In fact, history could never fully secure these 
claims; its status as an empirical pursuit remained in question throughout the late nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries. But the doubt was itself sufficient to impress that it could be more 
than merely a literary activity. In this context it is as well to pose a question put by Foucault: 
 
We should be […] asking ourselves about the aspiration to power that is inherent in 
the claim to being a science. The question or questions that have to be asked are 
‘what kinds of knowledge are you trying to disqualify when you say that you are a 
science?’
49
 
 
Tosh has argued that ‘near-universal literacy raises the stakes’ of historical writings by 
enabling ‘the mainstream establishment interpretations’ to ‘penetrate everywhere’
50
. Scholarly 
history retreated before the rising tide of literacy into a positivist mode that attempted perhaps 
not to understand the past as such, but only to secure control over historical writing against a 
burgeoning literary culture. If the kinds of histories that had previously regulated the past were 
confounded by the expansion of the presses, the impulse became to re-regulate the past in 
new less accessible ways. Not any kind of history would now do, only those rooted in difficult 
to access historical archives and records. The man of letters, a ‘whose synoptic vision […] is 
able to survey the whole cultural and intellectual landscape of his age’
51
 was superseded by 
the scholarly historian; that synoptic vision replaced by an increasingly compartmentalized 
historical knowledge. History was ‘professionalized’ in the same moment that literary culture 
was regulated in scholarly criticism
52
, although the impulse to protect ‘minority culture’
53
  
drove the two once closely associated disciplines in different directions: towards realism and 
idealism respectively. Munslow has suggested that the rise scholarly publishing ‘braced the 
nineteenth century disciplining of the past’
54
. History re-emerged in forms of new writing that 
in their regulation of the past sought to both conceal their literary nature and eradicate the 
influence of the present. 
The new empirical history was able to rescue the past from its more mythapoeic field 
and render it empirically knowable in part by exploiting the ontological stability with which 
printing seemed to allow writing to be regarded. It therefore became complicit in the values of 
print culture: both relying on them and amid the explosion of knowledge in the nineteenth 
century also extending them. Burrow has argued that printing ‘made less immediate 
difference than might be supposed’
55
; the real ‘printing revolution’
56
 was not located in the 
technology of the press, but in the conventions governing the creation and consumption of 
writing that technology made possible. These conventions developed gradually as print 
culture strengthened its grip, culminating in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries 
at the very moment that scholarly history was developing its empirical stance. Printing offered 
the promise of an ontologically stable form of writing that would offer up its meanings more 
easily
57
; the exegesis of medieval interpretation declined as standardized grammar, 
morphology and syntax each helped secure the correspondence of world and word
58
. The 
development of descriptive bibliographic frameworks reinforced the idea of textual unity in the 
material artefact, and directed interpretation towards authorial intention
59
. Text became less a 
site of the cultural production of meanings, and more a vessel for memorialising individualized 
original expression. The constant iteration of memorial truths that characterize what Burrow 
termed ‘intermittent culture’ was replaced by the gradual accretion of knowledge in a 
‘continuous culture’
60
. It has even been argued that printing underpinned the Enlightenment
61
, 
although it is probably more accurate to say that printing enabled Enlightenment rationalism 
to make certain assumptions about the ontological status of writing which in turn helped 
secure its progressive epistemological ideals. The printed text became a stable vessel for 
knowledge, separating the known from the knower in the processes of its production, 
transmission, and aggregation
62
. Scholarly history drew itself up on the scaffolding of 
essentially metaphysical notions about the ontological status of writing and its epistemological 
function that largely reflected the conventions of print reproduction. 
The ontological stable text helped imply the putative objectivity of historical accounts. 
Munslow has argued that the separation of knower and known is central to modernist 
historiography
63
. Scholarly history depended on the notion that the truths of the past exist 
independently of the historical work. By isolating the text from the contingencies of tradition, 
memory, and oral culture printing impressed the idea that historical accounts could be more 
than merely the highly situated subjective narratives they so clearly were. It impressed that 
they could reveal the true meanings of the past, rather than merely appropriating the past and 
imposing their own meanings. In abstracting the individual written work from the wider textual 
field and imbuing it with an authenticity associated with authorial intention inscribed in an 
original creative act, printing also abstracted the historical account from the mythapoeic field 
in which past and present are fused by clearly contemporary values. The finalized printed 
work also implied a final objective history on which individual accounts could converge. The 
imposition of authorial authority over the written work was also an imposition of the historian 
on the real past. The historical work was not open to interpretation because it was already an 
interpretation; any negotiation about the truths that it claimed was deferred to the sources. 
Scholarly history therefore assumed for itself a sphere outside of the historical process from 
which it could project its interpretations onto a phenomenal past; a sphere in Barthes terms 
‘occupying a part of the space of books’
64
. 
 
 
 
It is in the tendency of digital technologies to undermine the apparent stability of writing, 
destabilising the assumption that the past is rendered knowable through its surviving traces, 
that the crisis of history in the information age is situated. The whole social context in which 
writing is produced and consumed has changed in ways that inevitably influence how we 
frame the idea of a knowable past. Susan Blackmore has distinguished between two modes 
of cultural reproduction: copying the instructions and copying the end-product
65
. The age of 
print generally relied on copying a material product; an original exemplar becomes the basis 
of all subsequent copies. As a consequence form and meaning become united in the materiel 
artifact; writing became in Buckland’s terms a thing
66
. Digital texts are conversely 
algorithmically produced at the point of consumption; their reproduction occurs by copying the 
instructions for recreating them during the cycle of transmission and use. Digital technologies 
have therefore effected the virtual eradication of the material basis of the written work. Digital 
writing is not indelibly inscribed in its medium, but is recreated with every use. From this 
apparently minor change in the mode of reproduction the very different qualities of digital 
textuality flow. 
If mass media introduced a ‘secondary orality’ associated with radio, television and 
cinema
67
, we are perhaps witnessing a secondary literacy associated with digital computing
68
.  
Writing is now thoroughly integrated into our social lives: we put it to greater and more varied 
use than ever before. With its use in asynchronous communications such as email, instant 
messaging, discussion groups, and social networking services, digital writing has adopted 
some of the characteristics of speech. New grapholects, such as txtspeak and leetspeak, 
have emerged to supplement standardized written forms. The emphatic mood has been 
extended with the use of acronyms and emoticons to expand writing’s emotional range in 
imitation of speech. These ostensibly new uses of writing undermine conventions particularly 
associated with print reproduction. Spelling, capitalization, grammar and punctuation are all 
perhaps used more playfully
69
. Writing has also become the site of performance with specific 
kinds of language play emerging in virtual environments, such as identity play
70
. Digital writing 
has become a kind of hybrid of spoken and written forms; it is both a medium of 
communication and of record, carrying meaning in new ways
71
. 
The decentralized contexts of its creation and dissemination make much digital 
writing resistant to the kinds of fixed final form associated with print. Writing itself and written 
works have become more mutable and more malleable. This is exemplified by the wiki, in 
which the textual work is constantly evolving to meet the shifting expectations and needs of its 
users. Digital texts are often subject to this kind of constant drift. In digital contexts writing is 
often highly participatory and derivative; many digital texts do not emerge in single original 
creative acts, but in mash-ups, collaborations, and adaptations epitomised by slash fiction. 
Digital texts are consequently more explicitly situated as participants in an intertextual space. 
Their meanings are often generated in the relationship forged between works, both by 
allusion, and by the fabric of hypertext itself. Something like this is explicit in the epistemology 
of the Web; Berners-Lee has noted: 
 
I liked the idea that a piece of information is really defined only by what it’s related to 
and how it is related. There is really little else to meaning. The structure is 
everything
72
.   
 
As a consequence digital texts find new meanings in the dialogues they create within their 
ephemeral contexts, not only through the explicit contextualisation implied by hypertext itself, 
but also from ad hoc contextualisation that emerges through search engine results sets, 
social bookmarking services and the like. The fabric of digital textuality is geared towards 
what Henry Jenkins has termed participatory culture
73
, implying a pluralizing of textual 
authority that goes against the ‘stabilising, individualising, internalising effects’ of printing
74
. 
Changes of this kind fundamentally alter the way in which we approach the idea of an 
already historicized record situated within the persistent traces of digital culture. Emerging 
into the contested sphere of mass publishing history could hardly help reflecting in its attitude 
to sources assumptions about the status of writing that had underpinned Enlightenment 
rationalism. Those assumptions enabled source-writing to become subject of critical empirical 
investigation; to become in Eaglestone’s terms ‘reliable’ and ‘testable’
75
 (or rather reliable 
precisely because it becomes testable against qualities impressed on the textual work). Elton 
suggested that ‘criticizing the evidence means two things: establishing its genuineness, and 
assessing its proper significance’
76
. The ways this is achieved remain remarkably consistent 
across different schools of scholarly history. They include: establishing the type of source, 
how and why it came into being, what person or group created it, what attitudes, prejudices or 
vested interest it reflects, who it was written by or addressed to, whether the author, date and 
place of writing are what they purport to be, whether it can be traced back to the office or 
person who is supposed to have produced it, whether it is in the form expected, whether the 
age of paper, parchment and ink are what they should be, and so on
77
.  These tests reveal a 
number of essentially metaphysical assumptions about the nature of source-writing: that it is 
essentially stable allowing access to ‘the meaning of a past reality: a meaning that is 
enduring’
78
; that it can be accurately described using certain conceptual categories, such as 
author, date of composition, against which we are invited ‘to test its authenticity’
79
; that this 
authenticity is secured against the site of its original production, or ‘the person or group of 
persons [who] created the source’
80
; that there is a real distinction between genuine source-
writing and later interpolation that can be traced through the material history of the textual 
medium or ‘elicited from the surface appearance’
81
, and that there is some direct relationship 
between source-writing and past-reality that underpins the ‘belief in the language 
correspondence of present word and past world’
82
. History could only secure its status as 
empirical science against its always-undermining status as a clearly literary pursuit by making 
precisely these kinds of assumptions, each of which help establish the written source as a 
testament to real past experiences.  
Unfortunately the technological changes of the information age have had the effect of 
undermining precisely these assumptions on which history established its idea of a knowable 
past. They undermine the ‘reliable’ source by destabilising the qualities against which it 
becomes empirically ‘testable’, exposing history’s ideas about the nature of writing as 
entangled with the influence of print reproduction. This becomes clear in the information age 
because often the kinds of questions posed in source-criticism simply make no real sense 
when applied to the products of digital culture. Tosh insisted that ‘written sources are usually 
precise as regards time, place and authorship’
83
, but digital texts are rarely precise in quite 
these ways. Writing emerging in collaborative environments does not always have an author 
as such, cannot always be associated with a single place or date of writing, or to an office or 
person who is supposed to have produced it. Elton suggested that ‘the real meaning of the 
surviving materials must be elicited from the surface appearance’
84
. But the highly mutable 
nature of digital writing, in which the same works may be re-presented very differently within 
different media and computing environments, means that the form of the document is often no 
real indicator or source or provenance. Because of their dematerialisation, the authenticity of 
digital texts cannot be traced against any material history. They neither wither nor fade. 
Unless deliberately corrupted they survive unblemished or not at all. The empirical tests 
against which the authenticity of sources is secured break down under conditions of a 
mutable, malleable and volatile digital record.  
This raises a more fundamental problem with the idea of the already historicized 
record as it relates to the products of digital culture. Scholarly history had assumed that aside 
from any deliberate interpolation in the historical record, the effects of which can be guarded 
against by rigorous empirical analysis, the historical sources would present themselves more 
or less as originally created, albeit reflecting only a fraction of what must once have existed 
and bearing the scars of their material history. But this assumption cannot be made of the 
products of digital culture. Its dematerialized nature means the digital record can be rewritten 
by silent hands at every turn without leaving any trace of that intervention; only convention 
dictates intervention should be recorded, and such conventions are dependent on intrinsically 
unstable socially and politically situated practices. This potential mutability creates an 
inescapable uncertainty about the genuineness of digital source-writing; empirical analysis 
cannot penetrate the dematerialized artefact to confirm its authenticity against its material 
history. As more of our lives are documented only in the digital realm, context-based source 
criticism techniques also begins to founder; the entire context becomes as untrustworthy as 
the individual record. The hybrid nature of digital writing, situated somewhere between the 
spoken and the textual work, undermines the reliability and provenance of the digital trace, 
and its correspondence with any real experiences it may purport to both contain and explain.  
Much like the histories that emerge in the oral tradition the knowable past must perhaps 
inevitably give way to an expedient past that quickly forgets inconvenient truths and forever 
rewrites itself with every generation to reflect changing concerns
85
. The past and the trace 
have become irrevocably detached. 
 
  
 
There are two ways to respond to this apparent intransigence of digital artefacts to those 
presuppositions history incorporated into its interrogation of source-writing. It may be that they 
are so different in kind from the historical traces to which we are used that they cannot be 
regarded as historical sources in any traditional sense. In this case the history of digital 
culture becomes impossible until new ways are found to establish the provenance and 
authenticity of its source-writing; we are bought to the cusp of a new dark age or the end of 
history. On the other hand it may be that the tacit assumptions about the status of the 
historical record that make possible the idea of a knowable past are simply wrong. While our 
values are still largely those of the print tradition, digital textuality is not quite the same. Digital 
texts resist final signification and stability. They resist final classification and stable 
contextualisation. They are always straining at the edges of their own meaning. But digital 
texts perhaps only reveal the resistance of all writing to final signification and closure. The 
medium of writing itself has not changed in any particularly significant way, only the media 
within which it is embedded and inscribed, and their concomitant modes of production and 
reproduction. If those superficial changes seem to expose new potentialities, new kinds of 
creativity, new kinds of ephemerality, a new mutability, and a new intransigence to final 
signification, then we are entitled to question whether these were in fact qualities always 
present in the written record but to which we had blinded ourselves. And if so we arrive at the 
worrying proposition that the mutability of the digital record threatens not only the possible 
histories of the information age, but the validity of all historical enquiry pursued through 
interrogation of the surviving traces of the past. Not only our future histories, but the whole 
idea of a knowable past is undone. This is an unsettling idea, but appears nevertheless to be 
an inescapable outcome of the ways digital communications technology are changing our 
understanding of the qualities of the written word.  
 Derrida has suggested that the ‘death of the civilization of the book’ is inaugurating a 
‘new mutation in the history of writing, in history as writing’
86
. Where Collingwood famously 
characterized all history as the history of thought
87
, Derrida implies it is merely the history of 
writing itself; an affect of the civilization of the book or a kind of trace irreducibly inscribed in 
the relationship between written artefacts of different kinds from different eras.  This suggests 
that history and writing are inexorably bound; more than merely a literary activity, the idea of 
history is literally exhausted in the written work. The past is fabricated in writing; there is no 
knowable past outside of the text. One reason for suspecting this arises from the dissolution 
of the linguistic sign central to poststructuralist theory. Elsewhere Derrida argued that a 
logocentric bias in Western philosophy distorted our understanding of writing; dominant 
correspondence theories of language entailed a pervasive ‘metaphysics of presence’ in which 
external reality is said to be re-presented to the mind through language
88
. Saussure’s critique 
of the sign implied that meaning was deferred through the chain of linguistic difference
89
. 
Writing involved what Barthes described as ‘the generation of the perpetual signified’
90
 and 
Eco as ‘unlimited semiosis’
91
. Any correspondence of world and word was lost in the self-
referential play of language; reality slipped away in the spaces between signs. This also 
implies the lack of a real phenomenal past in historical accounts. The past becomes a 
construct in the play of signification; a way of ‘drawing a line around a vacant place in the 
middle of a web of words, and then claiming that there is something there rather than 
nothing’
92
. The dissolution of the linguistic sign is also therefore the dissolution of the 
phenomenal past in historical accounts.  
Although controversial, this idea emphasizes a troubling complicity and duality in 
history’s relationship with writing: it is both the subject of historical representation and the 
medium within which representation is embodied. This complicity is partially concealed by a 
distinction that generally emerges in history theory between the two uses that history makes 
of writing: the predominantly written traces of the past (primary sources), and their re-
presentation in predominantly written historical accounts (secondary sources)
93
. This 
distinction establishes a hierarchy of values that insulates the putative authenticity of the 
historical trace from those various interpretations in which it is given voice, and between 
which it is subsequently made arbiter. By securing history against the surviving record it 
apparently resolves any lingering suspicion that the past is constructed only in the historical 
text. But it creates another problem, opening up an epistemological gap between history and 
the past that it is difficult to close. Into that gap were poured the metaphysics of the text that 
helped secure the reliability and validity of source criticism. Theories of history can be 
characterized as those various attempts to stitch the absent past back into historical accounts 
without fully collapsing the history/past dichotomy. Nevertheless there remains something 
troubling in this generally unacknowledged complicity, and in the failure to explore its 
consequences. It is difficult to untangle the two uses of writing to reveal the phenomenal past. 
Historical scholarship looks suspiciously like a hall of mirrors in which its own image is 
projected onto the past into infinite regress.  
An illustration of this effect emerges in Carr’s argument concerning the constitution of 
historical fact. Carr suggested that ‘the belief in a hard core of historical facts existing 
objectively and independently of the interpretation of the historian is a preposterous fallacy, 
but one which it is very hard to eradicate’
94
. Claims about the past are transformed into 
historical facts only when the accounts in which they appear are subsequently cited in other 
works
95
. The facts of history are generated in the discourse of history; primary sources are 
both subordinate to and largely a product of the secondary historical text. Although 
controversial, most criticism of this argument concerns Carr’s careless conception of fact, 
rather than the process by which particular claims are authenticated within historical writing
96
. 
But the social process that Carr described itself suggests that scholarly history is only 
engaged in rewriting and reworking previous accounts. History becomes an elaborate 
language game played-out between historians according to tacitly agreed rules that legitimize 
individual interpretations, rules that do not formally address the past but only particular uses 
of writing. History occupies the spaces between the record and the past and does not seem to 
belong to either. 
This socially situated process of rewriting history dissolves the distinction between 
primary and secondary sources and with it the idea of the knowable past. The primacy of a 
source is constituted in the historical account itself; it is inscribed within and mediated by the 
historical text. But the distinction remains important precisely because its helps secure 
history’s ‘reality effect’
97
. Barthes argued that historical scholarship exploits a sleight of hand 
in which the referent constructed in the historical account is projected onto a past to which it 
does not belong and subsequently used to validate the very accounts in which it originated
98
. 
This places history in Barthes’ category of mythology, a ‘second order semiological system’
99
 
in which sign (in this case the historical account) and signified (the historical source) together 
form a new sign without concrete referent (the past). The rigorous distinction between primary 
and secondary sources, the classification of evidence, and the props of scientific discourse all 
help disguise the process through which the historical past is fabricated in the text. History 
therefore secures its apparent objectivity by assuming a particular discursive form with agreed 
conventions, and by projecting its own image onto the records of the past. Each helps 
validate historical claims, but only against the rules of its language game. History can never 
transcend that language game to root itself in the knowable past. It is in this sense that history 
becomes ‘our lost referential, that is to say our myth.’
100
 History has assumed that the 
meanings of past realities are contained within source writing, revealed by critical analysis. 
Post-structuralism suggests conversely that meaning is not intrinsic to texts, but imposed by 
the various interpretive categories we bring to them. 
The new mutation of writing accompanying the technologies of the information age 
does not dislocate the knowable past from the surviving written traces, but exposes the 
knowable past as a vanishing referent. The value of writing as a record of previous 
experience is secured against the idea that sources emerges at specific points in time and 
space as a result of the deliberate acts of identifiable persons, and inscribe meanings that 
reflect the experiences of those persons accurately, duplicitously or otherwise. In the more 
participatory spaces of digital culture these associations apparently break down; the mutability 
and malleability of digital writing transform it into simulacra: signs sign without referent
101
. 
Real historical experiences are therefore difficult to anchor against particular written artefacts. 
But the original creative act against which the authenticity of the text was always only a 
‘useful fiction’ implying an unmediated access to intentional meanings that does not withstand 
scrutiny. Printing helped impress the idea of an ontologically stable text by petrifying writing at 
stages in its ongoing production, but all writing in whatever medium is already rewritten in a 
number of complex ways. They involve the working-over and assimilation of other written 
artefacts, often betraying what Bloom described as the anxiety of influence
102
. They are 
therefore subject to ‘the intertextual in which every text is held’
103
, being composed from 
allusions that are ‘anonymous, untraceable, and yet already read’ being ‘quotations without 
inverted commas’
104
. They are complicit in the conventions of particular textual practices, from 
administrative processes through to the literary work. The text can never escape its 
enmeshment within the wider fabric of literary culture. It is hemmed in on every side by the 
patterns of linguistic practice, moulding the writings on which it consciously and unconsciously 
draws, and being itself moulded by subsequent works. If the meaning of source-writing cannot 
be secured against the real historical contexts in which it was produced, then the experiences 
is inscribes cannot be directly reveal specific historical realities. 
By changing the contexts within which writing is produced, transmitted and 
consumed, digital technologies merely make explicit what post-structuralism implied: both that 
writing is simply not the kind of medium that scholarly history assumed, and that it is unable to 
carry meaning in the stable and enduring ways history demands. History had assumed that 
any meaning its source-writings convey corresponded to some real historically situated 
intention, whether or not reflecting things ‘as it really was’, as it appeared to be, or only as the 
writer would have liked us to believe them to have been. In this finality of meaning the 
creators of the traces of the past are re-presented to us in their own unchanging words, 
forever condemned to testify to their own apparently intentional meanings. The idea that 
meaning is never more than interpretation, and that interpretation is always already 
historically embedded, so that rather than the sources revealing their meaning to us we 
instead impose on them our own meanings is incompatible with this. By highlighting the 
mutability and lack of finality of all texts, that intentionality is not involved in meaning, that the 
traces of the past are lost in the play of history, and in particular that both medium and 
message are historically situated and temporally contingent, digital technologies exposes 
scholarly history’s claims to uncover the true meanings of a objectively knowable past as a 
fiction. The vanishing referent in digital culture reveals Collingwood’s assertion that all history 
is the history of men’s minds as a fallacy, reflecting only the capacity of print reproduction to 
construct a metaphysics of presence out of the written word in which the figurative voice of 
the past comes back haunt us. History is no more the history of men’s minds that it is of a true 
past; it is only the history of historical writing itself, and more than that the history of writing as 
record: the persistent trace of our attempts to assimilate previous experience into our own 
lives. We have not been plunged into historical darkness in the digital age, only made to 
recognize the little gloaming light we saw previously as darkness made visible by desire 
 
 
 
What then is left of the idea of history? Does history really lack all possible meaning in the 
information age? If the information society has in some ways undermined history, in others 
the past is an ever more immediate part of our social lives. Digital technologies perhaps allow 
a more democratic participation in historical discourse. Services like the British Library’s 
Turning Pages, the digitisation of the national Newspaper Library, Google Books, and the 
Census online open up access to the historical record, and in a very real sense do change 
our relationship with the past. Through them the long tail of historical record is put on public 
view. This has enabled new increasingly personal kinds of histories to emerge, exemplified by 
the popularity of genealogy, local history and life histories. Technology has allowed new kinds 
of specifically non-textual sources to contribute to our idea of the past, such as the oral history 
collection of the Imperial War Museum. It has also allowed marginal histories to find voice in 
digitally mediated social networks, as people come together across the world in new ways. 
And technology is creating new ways to experience history in film, television, video games 
and simulation. The immersive multimedia environments of Jorvik
105
 and The Canterbury 
Tales Visitor Attraction
106
, or the anachronistic mash-ups of films like A Knight’s Tale
107
 and 
games like World of Warcraft
108
 are in many ways no less authentic representations of the 
past than the equally fabricated reconstructions of scholarly history. In the process of making 
plain the influence of their medium, they reveal how scholarly history had always concealed 
the fictive and peculiarly literary bias of its own. The fascination with the information apparent 
in all spheres, from science to the humanities and social sciences, offers a real opportunity for 
information history to synthesise divergent aspect of contemporary experience. 
The truths of history in the information age are not inscribed in the historical text, but 
remain contingent and plural, emerging in the whole social process, through the entire 
structure of feeling in which we are inevitably already historically entangled. This may seem to 
imply that history becomes subject to an unrestrained relativism where all accounts are as 
good as any other, robbing history of any meaning. But the anxiety that attends to the 
possibility of historical research in the digital age reflects only the loss of certain kinds of 
claims about the true nature of the historical past, not the loss of all possible rational 
discourse in relation to history. Are there criteria other than the true meaning of the past 
against which to secure history? Ankersmit argues that ‘it is an empiricist superstition to 
believe that no such criteria can be conceived of and that prejudice, irrationality, and 
arbitrariness are the only options’
109
. By any reasonable assessment scholarly history was 
able to ground its claims more securely than other kinds of history, albeit in a way always 
undermined by the refusal of the past to fully divulge its secrets. But that security was bought 
at the cost of the diversity of experiences classified as history. On one level this can be 
framed as a means to tacitly privilege particular dominant discourses through the apparatus of 
power in the ways that many post-modernist history theorists imply
110
. But more importantly it 
involves real choices about what we understand history to be. Ankersmit argues: 
 
The (im)plausibility of historical accounts only manifests itself in the presence of many 
such accounts […] Hence, the more accounts of the past we have, and the more 
complex the web of their agreements and differences, the closer we may come to 
historical truth
111
  
 
The plurality of history matters not merely as a means of warding off society’s tendency to 
marginalize the experiences, traditions and beliefs of the disempowered, but also as a means 
of furthering our historical understanding. It allows us to choose not only between histories, 
but also between ways of writing history, and ways of engaging with the past. Ankersmit notes 
that ‘we will sometimes find ourselves [...] not being able to distinguish between truths de 
dicto and truths de re’ adding that that truth is ‘not the arbiter of the game but its stake’
112
.  
Scholarly history measured itself against an extrinsic truth: the correspondence of the 
historical account with ‘the meaning of a past reality’
113
. This inevitably tended to atomise the 
whole notion of historical truth in the verifiably factual statement, which never sat comfortably 
with the literary nature of the historical account. By contrast, the unanchored spaces of digital 
culture necessitate the foregrounding of intrinsic truth-judgements. The truths de re remain 
beyond our grasp, but the truths de dicto can be tested, not through correspondence or world 
and word, but correspondence of word and word. The internal consistency of historical 
accounts, not the external conditions under which they can be regarded as true of false, 
becomes critical to the ways in which we choose between versions of history. Thus we can 
continue to dismiss those kinds of accounts that claim the status of scholarship without 
embodying that claim. We can continue to reject those accounts that contradict the body of 
evidence, neither because they fail to reflect any true nature of past experiences, nor because 
they are superficially falsified by surviving evidence, but only because their claims to truth are 
contradicted by the manner in which those claims have been constructed and presented. Self-
consistency in the historical work will come to matter more than its consistency with a true 
past.  
 So history has meaning, the past has a future, but not of a kind imagined in the period 
of high-modernity. The death of scholarly history is only a rebirth of the lived social history in 
which the past is open to reincorporation into present experience rather than rigorously 
regulated by the academy. In many ways this represents only a relinquishment of the 
shackles of empirical enquiry. This does not mean of course that there will be no more 
scholarly empirical history. It implies only that scholarly history represents one of the many 
new and emerging ways of forging a relationship with the past; neither necessarily better than 
all the others nor necessarily worse but only a different kinds of situated discourse with its 
own traditions and assumptions. The potential of digital culture is in its essentially limitless 
cultural bandwidth. We are not obliged to squeeze all possibly, acceptable or permissible 
meanings into the limited medium of the printed book, the network television channel, or the 
national newspaper. Endlessly proliferating, essentially unlimited and often inaccurate 
information is all we have. Regulation of this new historical expanse is neither particular 
possible nor particular desirable; better to simply explore the very different kinds of stories it 
may disclose. Information history is in a unique position to develop a better understanding of 
how the shifting qualities of information itself, and our changing attitudes toward information 
artefacts might transform both our historical consciousness, and how we understand the 
already historical past.  
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